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Issue I

COURT REPORTS

Agency failed to consider any alternatives to the proposed action or
the relationship between the short-term uses of the environment and
enhancements of long-term productivity. Accordingly, the court
concluded the Agency failed to follow its regulations in reviewing and
approving the permit application, and that the appeal could be
sustained on those grounds.
The court next considered whether the Agency's decision was
supported by substantial evidence in the record. Section 5.3 of the
regulations state that if the Agency finds on the evidence before it, that
the proposed activity does not involve any regulated activity or involves
only a permitted use, the Agency may issue a letter of permission.
However, the record contained no evidence that the Agency made this
determination. Section 5.4 states that if the proposed activity is a
regulated activity not involving significant impact on the inland
wetland, the Agency may allow the activity. Again, the record
contained no evidence that the Agency determined that the action was
regulated. Moreover, the Agency presented no evidence that it ever
visited the site or requested any additional information. The court
concluded substantial evidence did not support the Agency's decision.
Thus, the court sustained on the grounds that the Agency failed to
comply with its regulations when it reviewed and approved the
application. The court also sustained because substantial evidence in
the record did not support its decision was not supported by
substantial evidence in the record.
Makayla Shannon
Fish Unlimited v. N.E. Utils. Serv. Co., 755 A.2d 860 (Conn. 2000)
(holding Connecticut's Clean Water Act did not confer upon
environmental organizations standing to litigate environmental permit
issues governed by state statute).
The plaintiffs, a number of environmental organizations and
groups, including Fish Unlimited (collectively, "Fish Unlimited"),
sought to enjoin the defendant, Northeast Utilities Service Company
("Northeast Utilities"), from discharging wastewater generated by
nuclear-powered electric facilities into Long Island Sound without
authorization. Northeast Utilities owned and operated Millstone
Nuclear Power Generating Station ("Millstone"), which housed three
nuclear generating units. Each unit was equipped with a once-through
condenser cooling system, which draws in large volumes of seawater
from Niantic Bay for cooling. The units subsequently discharged the
water back into Long Island Sound.
Under the federal and state Clean Water Acts, 33 U.S.C. section
1342 and Conn. Gen. Stat. section 22a-430, respectively, a person or
municipality must obtain a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System ("NPDES") permit, prior to discharging into United States or
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Connecticut waters. The Department of Environmental Protection
("Department") issues such permits, which remain in effect for five
years. Northeast Utilities' most recent NPDES permit ("1992 permit")
was due to expire in December 1997. However, Northeast Utilities
submitted a timely renewal application, pursuant to section 22a-430,
which was still pending during this proceeding. Under Conn. Gen.
Stat. section 4-182(b), the 1992 permit would remain in effect until the
Department had resolved the renewal application.
In superior court, Fish Unlimited alleged that under Conn. Gen.
Stat. section 22a-16, Millstone's water intakes and discharges caused
unreasonable pollution, impairment, and destruction of the air, water,
and other natural resources. Fish Unlimited also alleged that the
permit renewal application was legally deficient because Northeast
Utilities was not engaged in an activity of a "continuing nature"
pursuant to section 4-182, which would have prevented the 1992
permit's expiration. Specifically, Northeast Utilities represented in
their renewal application that they sought a permit to generate
electricity. However, Millstone was, in fact, not producing electricity at
the time of the application, resulting in its operation without a valid
permit.
The superior court referred the case to a judge trial referee, who
granted Northeast Utilities' motion to dismiss for lack of standing and
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Fish Unlimited appealed
to the state supreme court. The issue before the supreme court was
whether Fish Unlimited had standing in superior court, under section
22a-16, against Northeast Utilities to seek an injunction preventing the
operation of the nuclear facilities and a declaratory judgment
invalidating the discharge permit.
The court acknowledged that citizens seeking to protect the
environment are required to show specific, personal aggrievement to
sustain a standing challenge. However, Conn. Gen. Stat. section 22a-1
et seq. waives the aggrievement requirement in two circumstances.
First, prior to establishing aggrievement, a party may seek injunctive
relief "for the protection of the public trust in the air, water and other
natural resources of the state from unreasonable pollution,
impairment or destruction." Second, a person may intervene in any
administrative proceeding and challenge "the conduct which has, or
which is reasonably likely to have, the effect of unreasonably polluting,
impairing or destroying the public trust in the air, water or other
natural resources of the state." Although section 22a-16 abrogates the
aggrievement requirement for bringing an action directly in superior
court, case law limits section 22a-16's application and explains why
plaintiffs must pursue their claims by intervening in an administrative
hearing before the Department.
Under section 22a-430, the Department has statutory and
regulatory authority to issue water discharge permits, determine the
renewal application's completeness, and pursue any one of several
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remedies if it concludes that a discharge creates unreasonable
pollution or occurs without a valid permit. Therefore, since section
22a-430 governs permits, Fish Unlimited should have intervened with
the Department or in any administrative hearing challenging the
Northeast Utilities' conduct and permit renewal application in order
to have successfully waived the aggrievement requirement. Instead,
Fish Unlimited sought to use section 22a-16 to raise permitting claims
governed by section 22a-430. The state supreme court, therefore,
found that Fish Unlimited lacked standing to bring the action
pursuant to section 22a-16 in superior court and affirmed the trial
court's dismissal of the claim.
Elizabeth Appleton
Peck v. Edelman, No. CV 97056833S, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1903
(Conn. Super. Ct. July 10, 2000) (holding a high water mark boundary
of an abutting property to a non-navigable waterway did not alone
create usufructuary, riparian rights in such abutting property owner).
Windham Frog Pond ("the pond") was a twenty-one acre, nonKeith Peck ("Peck") owned land
navigable, artificial waterway.
abutting the western boundary of the pond. Peck brought this action
against Steven Edelman ("Edelman"), who allegedly owned the pond.
Edelman gave others permission to use the pond. However, Peck did
not feel he needed such consent. Peck contended Edelman interfered
with his riparian and/or littoral rights and sought a temporary and
permanent injunction to prevent Edelman from blocking access to the
pond.
The trial court granted a temporary injunction to preclude
Edelman from denying right of entry to the pond. Edelman filed a
two-count counterclaim, alleging trespass and seeking a declaratory
ruling from the court as to the parties' rights in and to the pond.
The Superior Court of Connecticut first looked at the chain of
title, both of the pond and abutting lands, and found no evidence to
support Peck's alleged entitlement to water rights of the pond. The
court concluded Peck merely owned the land abutting the pond, and
such land encompassed a high water mark boundary. The court found
the pond was located completely on the land owned and controlled by
Edelman. The court stated that under Connecticut law, high water
mark property lines for non-navigable waterways constituted the
watercourse shore on which property abuts.
The court then addressed Peck's rights in the pond. While Peck
alleged ownership through bordering property to the pond, Edelman
claimed possession through sub-aqueous pond land. The court noted
that riparian rights are neither an easement in the water nor an
appurtenance to the land. The court stated such rights constituted a
property right, which was inseparably annexed to the ownership of

